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Abstract
A patient with progressive posterior cortical atrophy (PCA) was examined on several tests of visual cognition. The 
patient displayed multiple visual cognitive deficits, which included problems identifying degraded stimuli, attending 
to two or more stimuli simultaneously, recognizing faces, tracing simple visual stimuli, matching simple shapes, and 
copying objects. The patient was also impaired in identifying visual targets contained at the global level within 
global-local stimuli (i.e., smaller letters that compose a larger letter). Although the patient denied any conscious 
awareness of the global form, he nevertheless displayed a normal pattern of global interference when asked to 
identify local level targets. Thus, the patient processed the global information despite not being consciously aware 
of such information. These results suggest that global-local processing can take place in the absence of awareness. 
Possible neurocognitive mechanisms explaining this dissociation are discussed. (JINS, 2002, 8, 461-472.)
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INTRODUCTION
Dementia has been defined as a loss of cognitive function­
ing in two or more areas of cognition, including memory, 
language, judgment, abstract reasoning, and visual cogni­
tion (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The major­
ity of dementia cases are due to Alzheimer’s disease (AD), 
a progressive disorder characterized by neurofibrillary tan­
gles and neuritic plaques in the medial temporal lobes and 
association cortices (Terry & Katzman, 1983; Terry et al., 
1981). The specific deficits associated with AD are impair­
ments in memory, naming, problem solving, and visual cog­
nition (see Bondi et al., 1996). Although memory functions 
have been the primary focus of research in AD, it is now 
apparent that visual cognitive deficits can represent a pro-
Reprint requests to: J. Vincent Filoteo, Psychology Service 116-B, 
Veterans Affairs Medical Center, 3350 La Jolla Village Drive, San Diego, 
CA 92161. E-mail: vfiloteo@ucsd.edu
found area of impairment in these patients (Filoteo et al., 
1994). The visual cognitive disorders observed in AD are 
often similar to those seen in patients with focal damage to 
the parietal lobes, in general, and the right parietal lobe, in 
particular (Filoteo et al., 1994; Mendez et al., 1990a, 1990b). 
For example, AD patients are often impaired on tests of 
visual construction, visuo-spatial judgments, and visual ob­
ject recognition (Filoteo et al., 1994; Mendez et al., 1990a, 
1990b). In most cases of AD, the primary sensory and mo­
tor areas are relatively spared as compared to other brain 
regions (Braak et al., 1989; Lewis et al., 1987), and as a 
result, most AD patients do not experience deficits in basic 
aspects of sensory or motor functioning.
Although a generalized cognitive decline occurs in most 
patients with AD, it is now clear that some patients develop 
progressive deterioration in a single cognitive domain prior 
to the development of more global cognitive impairment. 
For example, several case studies have been reported on 
patients with progressive aphasia (Galton et al., 2000; Luzatti
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& Poeck, 1991; Mendez & Zander, 1991; Mesulam, 1982; 
Morris et al., 1984; Petersen, 1998; Poeck & Luzatti, 1988; 
Snowden et al., 1992), alexia (Beversdorf & Heilman, 
1998; Freedman et al., 1991), and apraxia (De Renzi, 1986; 
Dick et al., 1989; Fukui et al., 1996). Neuropathological 
studies of these patients have identified pathology in the 
expected brain regions, given the nature of the patients’ 
neurocognitive deficits (e.g., left perisylvian involvement 
in cases of primary progressive aphasia; Mesulam, 1982). 
Further, histopathological studies have revealed not only 
the pathology observed in AD (i.e., neuritic plaques and 
neurofibrillary tangles), but also other histopathological 
changes including Pick bodies and Lewy bodies (Farina 
et al., 1996; Galton et al., 2000; Kirshner et al., 1987; Me­
sulam, 1982,1987). These findings indicate that these focal 
progressive disorders can be due to pathology other than 
that which is typically associated with AD.
In addition to cases of primary aphasia, alexia, or apraxia, 
several cases have been reported on patients with progres­
sive cognitive deterioration with the initial or primary cog­
nitive disturbances in the area of visual cognition. This 
particular presentation of progressive cognitive change has 
been given a variety of labels, including the visual variant 
of AD, the occipital lobe variant of AD, or posterior cortical 
atrophy (PCA). Neuropathological studies of patients who 
initially presented with visual disturbances, and then later 
went on to develop other symptoms of dementia, have re­
vealed primary involvement of the occipital lobes, occipital- 
parietal regions, and occipital-temporal regions (Berthier 
et al., 1991; Hof & Bouras, 1991; Hof et al., 1983, 1989, 
1990; Morrison et al., 1991). Although most histopatholog­
ical studies have identified AD pathology in these patients 
(i.e., neuritic plaques and neurofibrillary tangles), we use 
the term PCA to refer to this clinical presentation because 
other studies have found a variety of neuropathological pro­
cesses in these patients (see Victoroff et al., 1994).
The primary deficit in patients with PCA is a profound 
impairment in perceiving visual information, although the 
nature of their deficits can vary. For example, some patients 
have been reported to have Balint’s syndrome, which con­
sists of simultanagnosia, deficits in reaching, optic ataxia, 
and gaze apraxia (Cogan, 1985; Coslett et al., 1995; Flekkoy, 
1976; Graff-Radford et al., 1993; Mendez & Cherrier, 1998; 
Mendez et al., 1990). Other reports have indicated that these 
patients can exhibit Gerstmann’s syndrome, which includes 
agraphia, finger agnosia, and right-left disorientation (Freed­
man et al., 1991; Mizuno et al., 1996). Mixtures of Balint’s 
and Gerstmann’s syndrome have also been reported in pa­
tients with PCA (Benson et al., 1988; De Renzi, 1986; Freed­
man et al., 1991; Pietrini et al., 1996; Wakai et al., 1994). 
Other deficits noted in patients with PCA have included 
alexia with and without agraphia, prosopagnosia, visual 
neglect, or extinction to double simultaneous stimulation 
(Ardila et al., 1997; Berthier et al., 1991; Cogan, 1985; 
Crystal et al., 1982; Freedman et al., 1991; Levine et al., 
1993; Mendez & Cherrier, 1998; Neary & Snowden, 1987; 
Nissen et al., 1985). In some cases, patients can experience
a single visual cognitive deficit for a number of years prior 
to the development of any other visual cognitive distur­
bances. Further, the profile of visual impairment in PCA 
patients can change as the disease progresses (Attig et al., 
1993; Della Sala et al., 1996; Mendez & Cherrier, 1998; 
Ross et al., 1996).
Despite the variability of visual cognitive and associated 
deficits in patients with PCA, one finding in many of these 
patients has been a profound impairment in perceiving more 
than one object at a time. For example, these patients are 
often described as being relatively normal in identifying the 
elements of a visual scene, but are often impaired (or com­
pletely unable in some cases) in perceiving the overall scene. 
This deficit, which can be most accurately described as 
dorsal simultanagnosia (see Farah, 1990), will manifest be­
haviorally in several different ways, including impairments 
in identifying degraded stimuli, naming pictured objects 
that have been cut up and rearranged, or coherently describ­
ing a visual scene, to name a few. We suggest that simul­
tanagnosia is a central deficit in many patients with PCA 
and could account for their general deficit in visual object 
perception.
A few recent reports have examined the possible neuro­
psychological underpinnings of PCA patients’ visual im­
pairments. Coslett et al. (1995), for example, examined 2 
patients with presumed PCA. In their study, PCA patients 
were presented with global-local stimuli that consisted of 
small (local) letters (e.g., small ‘S’s) that were arranged to 
form larger (global) letters (e.g., a large ‘A’; see Figure 1). 
Subjects were asked to detect a target that could appear at 
either the large or small level by pressing a key when the 
target appeared at either one of the levels and withholding a 
response if the letter appeared at neither level. The results 
indicated that both PCA patients were slower and less ac­
curate in detecting the target when it appeared at the large, 
global level. In fact, one of their patients could not detect 
any of the large letters on a subsequent global-local task 
where the stimuli were presented for an unlimited time pe­
riod. Because attention has often been likened to a “spot­
light” or “beam,” Coslett et al. (1995) interpreted these results 
as an indication that their patients suffered from a reduction 
in the size of their attentional “spotlight.” Other investiga-
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Fig. 1. Examples of global-local stimuli that are (a) congruent or 
(b) incongruent.
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tors (Stark et al., 1997; Thaiss & De Bleser, 1992) have also 
suggested this explanation of the visual cognitive deficits 
in patients with PCA.
This interpretation of PCA patients’ global processing 
impairment is consistent with other accounts of the visual 
cognitive deficits associated with simultanagnosia. For ex­
ample, one of the earliest descriptions of a patient with 
simultanagnosia attributed such visual disturbances to an 
impairment in attention (Holmes & Horax, 1919). Atten­
tion often has been a difficult construct to define, but there 
is some agreement that this cognitive process serves to se­
lect information in our environment for further processing 
(see, e.g., Posner & DiGirolamo, 2000). This further pro­
cessing is said to enable information to reach conscious 
awareness (Crick & Koch, 1990). Although there is a great 
deal of support for this conceptualization of attention, it is 
now clear that information that is unattended (or that does 
not reach consciousness) is nevertheless processed to some 
extent. For example, patients who have severe damage to 
the occipital lobes and display visual field defects can still 
display some residual visual abilities within their blind field 
(Marcel, 1998; Sanders et al., 1974). This “blindsight” phe­
nomenon occurs in the face of the patients denying any 
awareness of the visual stimuli that is altering their behav­
ior. Similar observations have been made in patients with 
simultanagnosia secondary to bilateral occipital-parietal dys­
function. For example, these patients can demonstrate nor­
mal facilitation in word identification when two semantically 
related words are presented simultaneously, despite their 
inability to see the two words at the same time (Coslett & 
Saffran, 1991). Such “implicit” processing in simultanag- 
nosic patients also has been displayed using the Stroop task 
(Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1998).
The purpose of the present study was to further report 
the visual cognitive abnormalities observed in an individ­
ual with PCA (patient M.H.).1 We therefore report the vi­
sual cognitive deficits displayed by our patient on standard 
and nonstandard neuropsychological tests of visual cogni­
tion. Further, given that we feel that a fundamental deficit 
in many patients with PCA is in perceiving multiple objects 
at the same time (i.e., simultanagnosia), we examined our 
patient on a directed attention task of global-local process­
ing. Note that the PCA patients in the study by Coslett et al. 
(1995) were tested on a divided global-local attention task 
in that the target could appear at either the global or the 
local level on consecutive trials. In the present study, our 
PCA patient was told at what level the target would appear 
and as such our patient did not have to divide or shift his
*It is important to note that although M.H. displayed global brain 
atrophy at the time of our evaluation (see Case History), he did display 
rather circumscribed atrophy of posterior cortices early in the course of his 
disease. Therefore, we chose to categorize M.H. as having PCA rather 
than categorizing him as having a visual variant of AD (which would be 
unwarranted given that we are uncertain of the nature of M.H.’s pathol­
ogy) or as having a specific visual behavioral syndrome (e.g., Balint’s 
syndrome; which would suggest that all patients with posterior degenera­
tion have the same behavioral problems).
attention between global and local levels (see Filoteo et al., 
1992 for a description of this shifting phenomenon in AD 
patients). In addition, two types of stimuli were used in the 
present study: congruent stimuli, in which the global and 
local forms were the same (e.g., a large ‘H’ made up of 
smaller ‘H’s), and incongruent stimuli, in which the global 
and local forms were different (e.g., a larger ‘H’ made up of 
smaller ‘S’s). In his original study using these stimuli, Navon 
(1977) found that normal participants were slower to detect 
a target if the stimuli were incongruent as compared to 
congruent, regardless of the level to which their attention 
was directed.2 This effect was said to be due to the irrele­
vant form interfering with the processing of the relevant, 
target form.
The use of congruent and incongruent global-local stim­
uli in the present study enabled us to examine whether our 
PCA patient would display normal interference effects, de­
spite the fact that this patient denied being able to see the 
global figure at all. If the global processing deficits are due 
to a restricted attentional spotlight, as suggested by Coslett 
and colleagues, then our patient should demonstrate normal 
interference effects when his attention is directed to the 
local level. That is, if PCA results in a restricted attentional 
spotlight, then the global information should be processed 
somewhat normally at an implicit level despite the fact that 




At the time of his participation in our study, M.H. was a 
66-year-old, married male who had 12 years of formal ed­
ucation, denied any problems learning basic academic skills, 
and reported being an average student. The patient was 
employed by an oil company for approximately 30 years 
and retired in 1989. Prior to that, he was in the military for 
9 years and obtained the rank of Sergeant First Class. M.H. 
was in relatively good health until 1989, when he began to 
experience problems with his vision, characterized as prob­
lems reading and difficulty driving. The patient also re­
ported that around 1990 he started to have problems with 
his memory. His wife confirmed this report and stated that 
he continued to have memory problems that had become 
progressively worse. Neuro-ophthalmic examination of the 
patient revealed deficits in basic visual processes, includ­
ing mildly constricted eye movements, impaired saccadic 
pursuits, and abnormal optokinetic nystagmus (particularly
2Although interference was found in normal controls when attention 
was directed to either the global or the local level, Navon (1977) found 
greater interference when attention was directed to the local level than the 
global level. This led to Navon’s proposal that global information takes 
precedence over local information. Based on more recent work, however, 
it appears that the global precedence effect can be altered by a number of 
factors, such as the size of the global and local features, the proximity of 
the local features, etc.
in the vertical plane). M.H.’s acuity was relatively intact 
(20/25 on the right and 20/30 on the left), and his optic 
nerves and maculae appeared to be normal. Tests of visual 
evoked potentials revealed delayed responses bilaterally with 
small wave forms. An MRI revealed significant global at­
rophy, although the posterior regions displayed greater vol­
ume loss relative to anterior regions (see Figure 2 as well as 
Footnote 1).
During our evaluation, M.H. was oriented to person and 
place, but had difficulty with the time of day and the exact 
date. He had severe problems naming past presidents spon­
taneously, but performed better when he was provided with 
phonemic cues (i.e., stating the first sound of the name). 
The patient was aware of current events, although he had to 
be prompted by the examiner. His speech was fluent, but he 
did have mild word finding problems during spontaneous 
conversation. His prorated Verbal IQ was 91 (Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Revised; Wechsler, 1981). His nonver­
bal IQ could not be obtained because of his profound visual 
impairments (see below). M.H. displayed severe memory 
problems, consistent with his and his wife’s reports, in that 
he was severely impaired in recalling word lists and short 
stories after 20- and 30-min delays. His language abilities 
were also impaired, but to a lesser extent. His phonemic
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Fig. 2. (a) Sagittal and (b) transverse MRI scans of 
posterior involvement.
verbal fluency (i.e., letter fluency) was within normal lim­
its, whereas his semantic verbal fluency was mildly im­
paired. He performed poorly on a visual confrontation 
naming test because of his visual impairments, but he was 
able to name 52 out of 60 items from the task when verbal 
descriptions of the items were presented. He also was able 
to identify eight out of eight common objects (e.g., keys) 
tactually. These results suggested that his naming abilities 
were relatively intact. M.H.’s raw scores for these neuro­
psychological tests can be seen in Table 1. Overall, M.H. 
was very aware of his cognitive deficits and reported feel­
ing frustrated about his visual impairments.
M.H.’s visual abilities were severely impaired. He had 
difficulty finding his way around the testing room. When 
greeted by the examiner with an outstretched hand, M.H. 
did not acknowledge the attempted handshake until his wife 
grabbed his hand and held it up. The patient displayed the 
three deficits characteristic of Balint’s syndrome. First, he 
was unable to see more than one object at a time (simultan- 
agnosia). This was demonstrated both by his inability to 
identify more than one object when presented simulta­
neously with other objects, and his impairment on clinical 
tests (see below). Second, he exhibited severe problems in 
redirecting his gaze once he fixated on a point in space
J. V. Filoteo et al.
(b)
M.H. displaying generalized cortical atrophy with greater
(ocular apraxia). Third, he had severe difficulty in reaching 
for objects presented directly in front of him, despite his 
knowledge of the presence of these objects (optic ataxia). 
He was able to trace a line and a rectangle when presented 
separately (see Figures 3a-3b). However, he was unable to 
trace accurately a line that overlapped a rectangle and tended 
to not see the line and rectangle as separate objects (see 
Figure 3c). This latter finding was a further demonstration 
of his simultanagnosia.
M.H. was also severely impaired in copying a daisy (see 
Figure 4). When asked to count the number of black dots on 
a page (Dot Counting subtest from the Visual Object and 
Space Perception Battery or VOSPB; Warrington & James,
1991), he was correct on only 5 out of 10 items. On this 
test, he tended to both over and under count the number of 
dots on the page. M.H. was unable to identify any items on 
the Incomplete Letters subtest of the VOSPB. This task is 
somewhat like a global-local task in that the subject must 
integrate local features in order to see the overall global 
form. He was unable to describe pictured visual scenes as a 
whole, but tended to focus on only a single detail of the 
scene. M.H. was able to provide verbal descriptions of ob­
jects he was asked to imagine. For example, he provided a 
very detailed description about a banana that included com­
ments about the texture, color, and shape. In contrast, M.H.
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Table 1. Neuropsychological test results of patient M.H.
Neuropsychological test Raw score Impairment level
WAIS-R Subtests1
Information 15 mild





Trials 1-5 Total 28 moderate
Short Delay Free Recall 3 moderate
Long Delay Free Recall 1 severe
Discriminability 50% severe
W M S-R3
Logical Memory I 9 mild-to-moderate






Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981). Impair­
ment level is based on normative data from Heaton et al. (1991). 
2California Verbal Learning Test (Delis et al., 1987). Impairment level is 
based on normative data from the CVLT standardization sample.
3Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1987). Impairment level is 
based on normative data from the WMS-R standardization sample. 
4Spreen & Benton (1969). Neurosensory center comprehensive examina­
tion for aphasia (NCCEA). Victoria, BC, University of Victoria Neuropsy­
chology Laboratory.
5Kaplan et al. (1978). An impairment level could not be determined be­
cause of the nonstandardized administration. See test for details.
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Fig. 3. M.H.’s tracing of (a) a single line, (b) a single rectangle, 
and (c) an overlapping line and rectangle. Note that when he traced 
the overlapping forms he did not appear to see the line and rect­
angle as separate objects.
was not very accurate in describing the layout of his house 
when asked to imagine how different rooms and pieces of 
furniture were related spatially. M.H. did not display any 
problems with right-left discrimination or praxis.
Global-Local Tasks
Stim uli and apparatus
Global-local processing was first evaluated in a free- 
observation condition using pictured stimuli presented on a
Fig. 4. M.H.’s drawing of a daisy.
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piece of paper. These global and local forms consisted of the 
letters ‘E’ ‘H,’ and ‘S.’ All stimuli were incongruent in that 
the local form and the global form were never the same. The 
stimuli were black on a white piece of paper. The stimuli were 
in a block shape and were constructed in a 4 X 5 grid. The 
global stimuli were 10.5 cm in height and 7.5 cm in width. 
The local stimuli were 2.5 cm in height and 1 cm in width.
The stimuli for the computerized reaction time (RT) task 
consisted of four global-local figures: A large ‘S’ made up 
of smaller ‘H’s (incongruent), a large ‘H’ made up of smaller 
‘S’s (incongruent), a large ‘S’ made up of smaller ‘S’s (con­
gruent), and a large ‘H’ made up of smaller ‘H’s (congru­
ent). The stimuli were block-shaped and were constructed 
in a 4 X 5 grid (see Figure 1). The global stimuli were 
8.6 cm in height, 5.5 cm in width, and subtended about 12° 
of visual angle. The local stimuli were 1.3 cm in height, 
0.8 cm in width, and subtended about 2° of visual angle. 
Stimuli were white on a black background and were pre­
sented on a color monitor using a personal computer. Re­
sponses were made on the computer keyboard and accuracy 
and RT data were recorded by the computer.
Procedure
M.H.’s global-local processing abilities were first evalu­
ated by having him view global-local stimuli that were 
presented on a piece of paper. In the first few trials, he was 
asked to simply view the global-local stimuli and describe 
what he observed. On a second set of trials, he was told to 
attend to only the large part of the picture and describe 
what he observed, and in a third set of trials, he was told to 
attend only to the small part of the picture and describe 
what he observed. Ten trials were presented for each of 
these conditions.
We next evaluated M.H.’s global-local processing on a 
computerized version of the task. In this task, the patient 
was seated approximately 40 cm away from the computer 
screen, although he was allowed to move his head freely. 
Two conditions were presented: a global directed condi­
tion in which M.H. was told to attend to the “large” part of 
the picture (i.e., the global level), and a local directed 
condition in which he was told to attend to the “small” 
part of the picture (i.e., the local level). The global condi­
tion was presented first and was immediately followed by 
the local condition. Each trial consisted of the presenta­
tion of a global-local stimulus and was initiated by the 
examiner. Immediately following the initiation of a trial, a 
global-local stimulus appeared on the screen until a re­
sponse was made or until 5 s had elapsed. M.H. was told 
that the target stimuli were letters and was asked to press 
one computer key if he observed an ‘S’ at the attended 
level (i.e., the global or the local level, depending on the 
condition) or another key if he observed an ‘H’ at the 
attended level. Each stimulus was presented 20 times and, 
as such, there were 40 congruent stimuli and 40 incongru­
ent stimuli. The stimuli were presented in a predetermined 
random order.
RESULTS
Free Observation Global-Local Task
During the free-observation global-local task, in which M.H. 
was presented global-local stimuli on pieces of paper, he 
was unable to detect the global target under any condition. 
Specifically, when shown the stimuli and asked to simply 
report what he observed, M.H. reported seeing only the 
local form and did not report seeing the global form at all. 
In the global directed attention condition, he was unable to 
identify any of the forms on the 10 trials. In contrast, he 
correctly identified the form 9 of 10 times in the local di­
rected condition, indicating that he was able to see and 
identify the local form fairly accurately.
Global-Local Reaction Time Task
As in the free-observation condition, M.H. was totally un­
able to identify the form in the global directed attention 
condition on our computerized task, so this condition was 
terminated after only 20 trials. Thus, it appeared that M.H. 
was completely unable to consciously report the form at the 
global level.
In contrast, his overall accuracy in the local directed con­
dition was 64 out of 80 (80%). M.H.’s accuracy in identi­
fying global level targets, however, depended on whether 
the stimulus was congruent or incongruent (see Table 2). 
Specifically, for congruent trials he was accurate on 36 out 
of 40 trials (90%), whereas for incongruent trials he was 
accurate on 28 out of 40 trials (70%). This difference in 
accuracy for congruent and incongruent stimuli was signif­
icant (Fisher’s Exact Test = 5.00, p <  .05). Thus, from an 
accuracy standpoint, M.H.’s ability to detect the local form 
was adversely affected by the incongruent global forms, 
despite the fact that he was unable to consciously report the 
global level form in the previous conditions.
This difference in perceiving congruent and incongruent 
stimuli was also observed in M.H.’s RT data. Prior to ana­
lyzing his RT data, we computed a 2 standard deviation 
cut-off for both the congruent and incongruent stimulus 
trials, and excluded any trial that fell outside of this range.
Table 2. Reaction time (ms) and accuracy rates (percent 
correct) for patient M.H. and normal controls (NC) for 
congruent and incongruent trials on the computerized 
global-local task. Numbers in parentheses are standard 
deviations.
Congruent Incongruent Interference effect
M.H.
RT 1508 (355) 1746 (495) -2 3 8
Accuracy 90% 70% 20%
NC
RT 552 (46) 577 (46) -2 5
Accuracy 100% 100% 0%
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This resulted in the exclusion of two congruent trials and 
one incongruent trial. The mean RT for the congruent trials 
was 1508 ms (SD = 355) and was 1746 ms (SD = 495) for 
the incongruent trials (see Table 2). These data were ana­
lyzed using an independent-sample T test, thus, each trial 
was treated as an independent observation. This T test in­
dicated that M.H. was significantly slower to respond on 
incongruent trials than congruent trials [£(59) = 2.2, p < 
.05]. Thus, similar to his accuracy performance, it appeared 
that M.H.’s speed in responding to local level targets was 
slowed by incongruent global forms, in that he displayed a 
reliable interference effect.
In order to determine if M.H.’s interference effect was 
similar to other individuals his own age, we ran 4 normal 
control (NC) participants on the local directed attention 
condition. These NC participants were screened for any 
history of neurological or psychiatric conditions. Their av­
erage age was 63.5 years (range: 54-70 years). None of the 
NC participants erred in the task, so only RT data were 
analyzed. Their mean RTs for the congruent condition was 
552 ms (SD = 46) and 577 ms (SD = 46) for the incongru­
ent condition (see Table 2). This difference was statistically 
significant based on a paired-sample t test [r(3) = 6.6, p < 
.01]. Therefore, like patient M.H., the NC participants dem­
onstrated a reliable interference effect.
Solid Stimuli
In order to help determine if M.H.’s deficits in consciously 
processing global level forms were due to the size of the 
stimuli, we presented him with single solid large letters that 
were the same dimensions as the global forms in the paper- 
version of the test, and single solid small letters that 
were the same dimensions as the local forms. The stimuli 
were either ‘S’s or ‘H’s. Ten small and 10 large stimuli were 
presented. M.H. was 100% accurate in identifying both the 
small and the large stimuli. His latency in identifying the 
large stimuli, however, was somewhat longer.
DISCUSSION
This study examined a patient with progressive visual cog­
nitive disturbances that included impairments in object iden­
tification, visual matching, and visual construction. Tests of 
more basic visual functions indicated that his visual acuity 
was intact, but he did have problems with eye movements, 
saccadic pursuits, and optokinetics. MRI scans demon­
strated that M.H. had substantial atrophy in the posterior 
cortical regions (see Figure 2). From a behavioral stand­
point, M.H. displayed many of the same visual cognitive 
deficits as other patients with presumed PCA. Of primary 
interest to the present discussion was M.H.’s deficit in see­
ing more than one object at a time (i.e., his simultanagno- 
sia). This impairment was displayed in a number of ways, 
including in his ability to describe a visual scene, count 
dots on a piece of paper, and identify degraded letters.
Consistent with M.H.’s simultanagnosia, the results of 
global-local tasks indicated that M.H. had a profound im­
pairment in processing larger, global forms, whereas he was 
considerably more accurate in processing local targets. In 
fact, he was unable to identify any global forms under any 
of the conditions. Thus, M.H. had severe difficulty in con­
sciously perceiving global information. Nevertheless, when 
his attention was directed to the local level on a computer­
ized RT task, the nature of the global form affected his 
ability to identify the target at the local level in that he was 
significantly slower and less accurate when the stimuli were 
incongruent as compared to congruent. Thus, M.H. dis­
played a significant interference effect that was similar to 
(if not larger than) that exhibited by normal controls. These 
results suggest that M.H. perceived the global form, albeit 
at an implicit level.
The major question that arises is, what is the mechanism 
that enabled the significant global interference in M.H., but 
did not enable him to consciously perceive the global infor­
mation? One possibility is that M.H.’s cortical atrophy re­
sulted in a restriction in the spotlight of visual attention. 
This notion has been raised by Coslett et al. (1995) to ex­
plain their findings with PCA patients. Further, Stark et al. 
(1997) invoked the notion of a reduced spotlight of atten­
tion to explain the visual cognitive deficits observed in their 
patient N.J., who also displayed progressive visual impair­
ments consistent with PCA. This explanation assumes that 
attention acts like a beam or zoom-lens (Eriksen & St. James, 
1986; Posner, 1980) that can move over the visual field. 
Objects that fall within this beam are then selected for fur­
ther processing. Based largely on their findings that pa­
tients with PCA are better at visually identifying smaller 
objects as compared to larger objects, Coslett et al. (1995) 
and Stark et al. (1997) have suggested that patients with 
PCA have a narrowed attentional spotlight. This explana­
tion of PCA patients’ deficits could also explain M.H.’s 
impairment in consciously perceiving the global form, in 
that a restricted attentional spotlight would enable M.H. to 
see only one (or perhaps two) local forms at any given time 
and would not permit him to consciously integrate the local 
forms into a gestalt. This could be the case especially if we 
are to assume that one of the primary roles of attention is to 
select information for further conscious processing. That is, 
if a patient had experienced a narrowed attentional beam, as 
opposed to simply a restriction in the visual field, then one 
would anticipate that such patients would have difficulty in 
consciously perceiving global level forms, but could still 
perhaps demonstrate some evidence of unconscious or non- 
attentive processing of such information.
Although this is a viable explanation of M.H.’s global- 
local processing results, there are some limitations to this 
interpretation. First, it did not appear that size per se could 
entirely explain the global-local findings, in that M.H. was 
able to identify larger, solid forms that were the same size 
as the global forms in the paper version of the global-local 
task. Although M.H. was somewhat slower to identify larger, 
solid figures as compared to smaller, solid figures (a find­
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ing that supports a narrowed spotlight explanation), his com­
plete inability to identify global level targets is clearly out 
of proportion to his simply being slower to identify larger, 
solid stimuli. Therefore, the absolute size of the stimulus 
could not be the sole explanation.3 Further, M.H. was un­
able to identify the global form when the stimuli were pre­
sented to him without a time limit (i.e., during the free 
observation condition). If M.H.’s impairment were due sim­
ply to a reduced attentional spotlight, he should have been 
able to compensate by moving the focus of his attention 
around in the untimed condition, much the same way a 
patient with a visual field cut is able to compensate by 
moving his or her head around. Second, the spotlight met­
aphor of attention has not always been successful in explain­
ing normal and abnormal global-local processing (see 
Robertson, 1996). For example, Filoteo et al. (2001) found 
that damage to the temporal-parietal area resulted in qual­
itatively different patterns of impairment on a global-local 
shifting task as compared to a spatial orienting task, where 
it is presumed that attention acts like a spotlight (Posner, 
1980). Therefore, an explanation of M.H.’s performance 
based entirely on a narrowed spotlight of attention is some­
what debatable.
Another possible explanation for the pattern of M.H.’s 
findings is that a deficit in attentional disengagement ac­
counted for his results. Farah (1990), for example, has ar­
gued that patients with dorsal simultanagnosia are impaired 
in perceiving more than two objects at once because they 
are unable to disengage their attention away from one ob­
ject in order to see the other object. As Farah (1990) pointed 
out, such an explanation does not argue that there is a gen­
eral reduction in visual attentional processes per se, but that 
normal attention becomes overly fixated on a single object, 
and the other objects are not perceived. Such an impairment 
could also account for M.H.’s global processing deficit in 
that it is possible that when viewing global-local stimuli, 
his attention becomes fixated on one local stimulus, and he 
does not integrate the other features because they are not 
overtly processed. Note that this explanation does not nec­
essarily require a reduction in the attentional spotlight or an 
impairment in attentional binding. Instead, it is possible 
that M.H. could not overtly identify the global form be­
cause he never consciously attended the requisite local forms 
that composed the global form. Although this is an attrac­
tive explanation, it does not explain why M.H. had prob-
3It should be noted, however, that Stark et al. (1997) found that their 
patient with progressive visual disturbances displayed faster responding to 
smaller, solid letters as compared to larger, solid letters on a true RT task, 
and that this was somewhat opposite to the pattern observed in their con­
trols. We continue to feel, however, that M .H.’s complete inability to con­
sciously identify global forms as compared to his slowness in identifying 
larger forms is so greatly out of proportion, that it argues against a simple 
size account of the present findings. It is also important to note that Coslett 
et al. (1995) have distinguished between simultanagnosia, which is not 
impacted by the size of the visual stimulus, and “attentional restriction 
agnosia,” which is affected by the size of the visual stimulus. If patient 
M.H. is not impacted by the size of the stimulus, as we suggest, his deficits 
are best described as a simultanagnosia.
lems identifying visual objects, such as those on the visual 
confrontation naming task. The process of object identifi­
cation is not typically thought of as requiring a disengage 
and shift of attention. As such, problems in the movement 
of attention should not impact simple object detection.
A third, and perhaps more plausible, explanation of M.H.’s 
explicit global processing impairment is that he was im­
paired in some form of attentional binding. This interpreta­
tion is related to the narrowed spotlight hypothesis, in that 
both explanations argue that attention serves to bind fea­
tures together. The binding hypothesis is based largely on 
Treisman’s feature integration model, in which the primary 
role of attention is to bind or “glue” features into objects 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980). The notion of a deficit in bind­
ing information has been used to explain the visual cogni­
tive deficits in other patients with focal lesions who display 
simultanagnosia (e.g., Friedman-Hill et al., 1995; Wojciu- 
lik & Kan wisher, 1998). For example, Wojciulik and Kan- 
wisher (1998) evaluated R.M., a patient with simultanagnosia 
secondary to bilateral parietal lesions, on tests that exam­
ined the ability to integrate visual features. These investi­
gators found that R.M. was unable to explicitly integrate 
the color of a word with the actual word itself, indicating 
that the patient had problems in binding two features of 
visual information. In contrast, however, R.M. displayed 
normal implicit binding of these visual features when tested 
under a Stroop-like condition. Specifically, R.M. was slower 
to identify the color of a word when it was incongruent with 
another word presented in the display, compared to when 
the color of the word was congruent with the other word in 
the display. These results indicated that R.M. implicitly 
bound the color of one word with the form of another word, 
despite the fact that this patient could not consciously re­
port such binding. Based on these findings, Wojciulik and 
Kan wisher (1998) concluded that the parietal lobes are re­
sponsible for the explicit binding or integration of visual 
information. Such an interpretation could also account for 
our findings in patient M.H. That is, it could be that damage 
to posterior brain regions resulted in a deficit in explicit 
feature integration.4 In the case of M.H., however, the def­
icit would be in binding local elements together rather than 
in binding two different features, such as color and shape. 
This interpretation of M.H.’s deficits would also help ex­
plain why he had problems in object identification on the 
visual confrontation naming task. A deficit in feature bind­
ing has been used to explain other patients’ deficits in ob­
ject identification (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; Shelton 
et al., 1994). Interestingly, a characteristic feature of the 
patients in these past studies was the inability to identify 
the overall form of an object but rather a predilection to 
focus on the details.
4Interestingly, R.M. has also been reported to show normal global 
interference when asked to identify local level targets, despite the fact that 
this patient is impaired in explicitly identifying global targets (Egly & 
Robertson, reported in Rafal, 1997). This finding further suggests that 
some sort of binding deficit could account for the pattern of global-local 
processing displayed by patient M.H. in the present study.
Although the possibilities described above could ac­
count for M.H.’s inability to consciously perceive global 
level forms, the question that remains is what is the cog­
nitive process that enabled M.H. to implicitly process glo­
bal level information, but not consciously perceive such 
information. One possible explanation is based on the no­
tion that some features can be processed as a whole prior 
to attention. These preattentive explanations of feature bind­
ing have been based primarily on studies with normal in­
dividuals. For example, previous studies have demonstrated 
that, under certain conditions, normal participants per­
ceive features as unitized objects when attention is not 
directed at those features (see Baylis & Driver, 1992; Ju- 
lesz, 1981; Moore & Egeth, 1997; Navon, 1990). These 
results suggest that some forms of perceptual integration 
can occur without attention. Preattentive processes have 
also been demonstrated in patients with unilateral neglect. 
Driver et al. (1992) found normal grouping of visual stim­
uli in the neglected hemifield in a patient with unilateral 
neglect, despite the fact that this patient denied having 
seen any information in that visual field. These results 
suggest that attention may not be necessary to integrate 
certain types of features, and, as such, preattentive pro­
cesses could account for the relatively normal, implicit 
interference effects M.H. displayed with global-local stim­
uli. There is, however, considerable debate regarding the 
types of visual processes that can occur independent of 
attention (Lavie, 1997; Mack et al., 1992; Rock et al.,
1992). Therefore, it is unknown at this time whether such 
preattentive processes could provide an entire account of 
M.H.’s normal implicit global processing.
As stated above, previous studies with bilateral parietal 
lesion patients found that these brain regions may be cru­
cial for some sort of feature integration or binding (Wojci- 
ulik & Kanwisher, 1998). Therefore, it is possible that 
damage to these brain regions is responsible for M.H.’s 
impairment in the explicit processing of global level forms. 
Indeed, neuropathological studies by Hof and colleagues 
(Hof et al., 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993; Hof & Bouras, 1991) 
of patients with PCA and Balint’s syndrome (which in­
cludes simultanagnosia) have indicated that the primary dis­
tribution of pathology in these patients is in occipital, 
occipital-parietal, and occipital-temporal regions. Given 
that the neuropathology associated with Balint’s syndrome 
in focal-lesion patients appears to be bilaterally in the 
occipital-parietal junction (Coslett & Saffran, 1991; Pierrot- 
Deseillgny et al., 1986; Rafal, 1997), it is likely that the 
Balint’s syndrome that appears in patients with PCA (such 
as patient M.H.) is due to a similar distribution of pathology.
The neuroanatomical basis of M.H.’s normal, implicit 
global processing is less clear. Other studies of neurologi­
cal patients who demonstrate visual perception without 
awareness have suggested two possibilities. First, it is pos­
sible that different neuroanatomical regions mediate con­
scious and unconscious visual processes. For example, in 
cases of blindsight where patients with severe occipital lobe 
damage display residual visual abilities under implicit test­
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ing conditions, several investigators have suggested that 
other brain regions, such as subcortical visual pathways, 
may mediate the residual visual abilities (Cowey & Stoerig, 
1991). In the case of M.H., it may be that brain regions not 
impacted by PCA are responsible for his normal implicit 
processing of global information. One potential candidate 
could be the occipital lobes, which have been implicated in 
certain binding processes (Grossberg et al., 1997; Sugita, 
1999). Indeed, a recent functional activation study impli­
cated the occipital lobes in the processing of global-local 
stimuli (Fink et al., 1997). However, given the extent of 
M.H.’s pathology at the time of our testing (see Figure 2), 
and the distribution of neuropathology found in other pa­
tients with PCA (which includes primary visual cortex), it 
is difficult to determine if the occipital lobes are intact enough 
to enable such processing. Another possible candidate brain 
region is the temporal-parietal junction. Lamb et al. (1989) 
found that patients with focal lesions of the temporal- 
parietal region did not display normal interference effects 
when the participants were required to direct their attention 
to the global or the local level. This finding suggests that 
these brain regions may be involved in the interference 
effect displayed by normal individuals, and in as much as 
M.H.’s pathology did not extend to this area, it is possible 
that this brain region was responsible for his normal im­
plicit processing of the global information.
The second possibility in regard to the neuroanatomical 
basis of M.H.’s normal implicit processing of global infor­
mation is that damage to a single brain region in M.H. 
resulted in an impairment in explicit global processing but 
not implicit processing. That is, one brain region (perhaps 
the occipital-parietal association cortex) is responsible for 
both implicit and explicit processing of global information, 
and the likely damage to this region in patient M.H. im­
pacted one process (explicit global processing), but left the 
other process (implicit global processing) intact. Although 
it is difficult to determine if this is the case in patient M.H., 
other investigators have used this approach to explain other 
cases of implicit visual perception. For example, Campion 
et al. (1983) suggested the possibility that spared regions of 
the occipital lobes could account for the residual visual 
abilities in patients with blindsight. In addition, Farah et al. 
(1993) have presented evidence based on computational 
models that damage to a single neural system can result in a 
dissociation between implicit and explicit facial process­
ing. Finally, a recent fMRI study by Rees et al. (2000) 
examined visual processes in a patient who displayed ex­
tinction to double simultaneous stimulation. These investi­
gators found normal activation in visual cortex contralateral 
to the side of a stimulus that had not been consciously per­
ceived, suggesting that the visual stimulus had been pro­
cessed normally in that brain region despite the fact that the 
patient was unaware of the stimulus. Taken together, these 
studies suggest that it may not be the case that a nondam­
aged brain region mediated the normal, implicit global pro­
cessing observed in patient M.H., but that damage to a single 
region resulted in this dissociation.
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Although M.H. displayed what appears to be normal glo­
bal interference, it is important to point out that not all 
patients with progressive visual disturbances have dis­
played this profile. Specifically, Stark et al. (1997) exam­
ined congruency effects in a patient with progressive visual 
disturbances using a global-local divided attention task. 
Their patient, N.J., was impaired in processing global level 
information and also displayed simultanagnosia. In their 
task (Experiment 5), participants were asked to identify at 
what level (global or local) a specific target appeared within 
a global-local stimulus. The stimuli were either congruent 
or incongruent, and were presented under a global bias con­
dition (i.e., targets appeared mostly at the global level) or a 
local bias condition (i.e., targets appeared mostly at the 
local level). In the case of the congruent trials, the correct 
response was either global or local. The critical comparison 
for this present discussion was between congruent trials 
and incongruent trials when the target was at the local level 
under the local biased condition. These trials are most like 
the congruent and incongruent trials in the present study, 
and if their patient displayed a similar congruency effect as 
patient M.H., RTs should have been larger in the incongru­
ent condition as compared to the congruent condition. Stark 
et al. (1997), however, did not observe this pattern, in that 
patient N.J. did not display any RT differences in the con­
gruent and incongruent trials. Thus, their patient did not 
display the same pattern as M.H. in the present study.
There are a few differences between our study and that of 
Stark et al., however, that could account for this discrep­
ancy. First, Stark and colleagues utilized a divided attention 
condition in which participants had to attend to both the 
global and the local level. Divided attention global-local 
tasks can invoke other attentional processes, such as requir­
ing participants to shift attention across consecutive trials 
(see Filoteo et al., 2001; Robertson, 1996), and these addi­
tional processes can be disrupted following posterior le­
sions (Filoteo et al., 2001). In contrast, participants in our 
study were told to focus on only one level of the stimulus 
(the local level) and to report what target they saw at that 
level. These differences in divided versus directed attention 
could possibly account for the discrepant findings. A sec­
ond possibility, however, is that the patient in the Stark 
et al. study had pathology that extended into the temporal- 
parietal regions. As stated earlier, damage to these regions 
has been known to eliminate the interference effects ob­
served with incongruent global-local stimuli. Obviously, 
future studies need to examine these possibilities more 
closely.
In summary, patient M.H. displayed a profound impair­
ment in the explicit processing of global information. In 
contrast, his implicit processing of global information ap­
peared to be intact. The cognitive basis of his explicit glo­
bal processing deficit may be due to an impairment in the 
conscious binding of features into objects or a deficit in 
disengaging attention away from individual local features, 
whereas his normal unconscious processing of global infor­
mation may be due to preattentive processes. The neuro-
pathological basis of M.H.’s explicit global processing deficit 
may be bilateral damage to the occipital-parietal regions. 
The neuroanatomical substrates of M.H.’s normal implicit 
global processing is less clear but could be due to normal 
processing in the occipital lobes or temporal-parietal regions.
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